Published Decisions

While most day-to-day court orders are not published beyond the county clerk's file in the particular case (public record for most cases, and sealed for matrimonial and some others), decisions from the appellate courts, as well as select trial level decisions, are published and used as guidance for deciding future cases.  Below is a list of published decisions where I have been the lawyer writing the briefs and/or arguing the appeal or motion:


PERSONAL INJURY

Murphy v. NYC Transit, 74 A.D.3d 1158 (2d Dept. 2010) - Reversing dismissal of claim against municipality for failure to properly respond to assault.

Morris v. Bianna, 69 A.D.3d 910 (2d Dept. 2010) - Affirming denial of summary judgment in dram shop claim related to stabbing in a bar.

Funk v. UPS, 73 A.D.3d 851 (2d Dept. 2010) - Dismissing claim for trip and fall based upon inadequate lighting during a charity event.

Luo v. Mikel, 625 F.3d 772 (2d Circuit, 2010) - Reversing summary judgment on issue of serious injury in a motor vehicle accident case.

Wang v. 161 Hudson, 60 A.D.3d 668 (2d Dept. 2009) - Affirming jury verdict on liability, and remanding for new trial on damages.

Strickland v. PAL, 2009 NY Slip Op 50067(U) (Kings County, 2009) - Denying summary judgment in case regarding negligent crowd control.

Zheng v. Cohen, 52 A.D.3d 801(2d Dept. 2008) - Affirming denial of motion to dismiss construction accident claim.

Stawski v. Pasternack, 54 A.D.3d 619 (1st Dept. 2008) - dismissal reversed, and summary judgment granted in Plaintiff's favor, in legal malpractice claim based upon failure to timely file a construction accident claim.

Vignapiano v. Herbert Construction, 46 AD3d 544 (2d Dept. 2007) - Dismissed negligence case against property manager.

MATRIMONIAL, DIVORCE, AND FAMILY LAW

Ferri v. Riutta, 2012 NY Slip Op 30299(U)(Suffolk County, 2012) - action by in-law against divorcing spouse related to, among other things, alleged loans during the marriage and intentional infliction of emotional distress, dismissing some claims and finding questions of fact as to others based upon ordinary contract principals, and dismissing the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the alleged conduct was not “so outrageous or extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency" and, as "New York State does not recognize a cause of action to recover damages for this tort between spouses... it would appear that an action by the parent of a divorcing party to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the actions by and between the divorcing child and child-in-law should not be recognized by this court.”

Stolte v. McLean, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op 50115(U) (Suffolk County, 2012) - granting declaratory judgment to claimants in a post-divorce action over life insurance and pension proceeds.

Gaffney v. Romanello, 82 A.D.3d 930 (2d Dept. 2011) - Affirming order regarding interim counsel fees.

Wallach v. Wallach, 2007 NY Slip Op 30864(U) (Suffolk County, 2007) - granting motion for discovery in post-divorce action for breach of settlement agreement.

BUSINESS

Bharucha v. Greenberg, 2011 NY Slip Op 30171(U) (Nassau County, 2011) - denial of motion for summary judgment in breach of contract action regarding escrow agreement in a real estate transaction.

Salomon v. Burr, 769 F.Supp.2d 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) - Denial of summary judgment on personal guarantee in a real estate transaction.

Abuelhija v. Chappelle, 08-cv-3679 (S.D.N.Y., 2009) - dismissal of claim for breach of settlement agreement in an entertainment/management dispute.

Kremen v. Morelli, 54 A.D.3d 596 (1st Dept., 2008) - Legal malpractice claim dismissed.

Rothman v. Morelli, 43 A.D.3d 769 (1st Dept., 2007) - Dismissing claim in attorney fee-sharing dispute.


EMPLOYMENT

Graham v. Fareed, 55 AD3d 405 (1st Dept. 2008) - dismissal claim in contract/employment action reverse.

Divorce Attorney: Pension and Life Insurance Benefits Agreement Enforced Post Judgment

I recently received a much awaited decision on one of my cases in the Suffolk County Supreme Court in a post-judgment matrimonial matter.  In this case, the stipulation of settlement in the prior divorce had provided for certain rights regarding one of the parties' pension and life insurance proceeds. That spouse, however, then made his second wife the beneficiary, who received the proceeds upon his death.  The first wife and children moved to enforce their rights, and the Court found:

Separation agreements purporting to equitably assign pension benefits should be given the same protection as Court Ordered benefits... a Separation Agreement expressly distributing pension benefits as marital property pursuant to the Equitable Distribution Law is enforceable...

Similarly, the court found:

A promise in a separation agreement to maintain an insurance policy designating a spouse as beneficiary vests in the spouse an equitable interest in the policy specified, and that spouse will prevail over a person in whose favor the decedent executed a gratuitous change in beneficiary...

The full decision can be read here.   

Save Sanity And Trees

                Other attorneys may disagree, but my general philosophy with legal drafting, whether drafting a contract or a litigation document, is to make things as simple, concise, clear, and efficient as possible.   “Papering” the other side can have some strategic advantage in rare instances, and often even a concise legal document would be considered voluminous by a lay person.   As a general rule, however, my contracts are written so that they can be easily understood without ambiguity or excess verbiage; my pleadings tell people what a case is actually about; my discovery demands and responses are short and to the point; and my motions are relatively easy to read and understand.

             One prime example where trees weep over the inefficiency of the legal profession is in discovery.   Many lawyers will preface their document demands with pages upon pages of meaningless instructions and definitions, followed by an unnecessarily large number of duplicative and barely intelligible demands.  The only “instructions” necessary for responding to a discovery demand are the CPLR and the Administrative Rules (in State Court), or the Federal Rules (in Federal Court), and the rules of the individual judge.  No matter what “instructions” an attorney puts on their demands, a party cannot unilaterally override those rules.
   

             Personally, with respect to discovery, I am a big fan of Rule 26 in the Federal Rules.    Under that rule, a “party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties…  (i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information… (ii) a copy of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment… and (iii) a computation of each category of damages claimed…  [and] documents or other evidentiary material… on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered” and (iv) insurance information.  

             Thus, under Rule 26, or a State Court discovery demand that parrots its language, everything should be disclosed - period.  Obviously, you may need some specifically tailored requests to ensure that everyone knows what is considered relevant, and so that you have a basis for seeking court intervention if there is noncompliance.  A laundry list, however, does not help anyone.  In fact, clever efforts to turn 10 demands into 200 only serve to create more work for everyone, including the Courts if they become involved.  Addressing discovery disputes over a handful of well-written requests is relatively simple when compared with fighting over dozens, or hundreds, of separate requests.    In fact, I think the reason for some of the overkill is lawyers being fearful that they will forget something, but it is a lot easier to overlook an issue buried within an encyclopedic demand than to monitor compliance with a tightly drafted one.  

             The same rule applies with virtually all legal drafting.  I recently filed a motion to dismiss for a defendant in a case where the Plaintiff's claim against my client, although highly defensible, was relatively simple.  The Plaintiff's attorney probably spent days drafting a complaint that rivaled war and peace.  They speculated all over the place "upon information and belief," and asserting dozens of far-fetched causes of action, but somewhere along the lines forgot to include the one basic claim that actually made sense.

             With motion practice, all the time lawyers will write tomes, expecting judges (who are, believe it or not, human beings), to parse out the one or two really important aspects of their argument -- which were conveniently placed in the middle of a footnote on page 145 of their brief.

             Keeping things concise and simple (which requires knowing what is important and what isn't), makes everything easier, and more cost effective, for lawyers, clients, and the courts.  

Divorce Attorney

"A civilized divorce is a contradiction in terms... l'm going to urge you to be generous to the point of night sweats. The all-important thing is to get you through this as quickly and cleanly as possible so that you can begin rebuilding your life." - War of the Roses

Constitutional Rights Attorney -- Criminal Harassment

The laws criminalizing "offenses to public order," (i.e. the "disturbing the peace" family of crimes such as harassment and loitering), need to be carefully drafted to avoid constitutional issues.  Frequently, the phrase "for no legitimate purpose" is added to these statutes, letting the courts define what constitutes a "legitimate purpose," so that constitutional issues can be avoided. See People v. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d 529 (1995).

Subsection One of New York Penal Law 240.30, defining Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree, however, has some drafting issues that need to be addressed by the State Legislature.  The law criminalizes any communication where someone "with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person... communicates... by telephone, by telegraph, or by mail, or by transmitting or delivering any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm."  This crime is classified as a Class A Misdemeanor, meaning that it carries a sentence of up to one year in prison and/or up to a $1,000 fine.

Essentially, as phrased, the law criminalizes being intentionally annoying or causing alarm, for any purpose. This could describe any other emergency communication or warning, such as reporting a fire or telling someone they need to go to the hospital right away; it could almost any argument over the telephone; or it could describe someone engaging in parody that is protected by the First Amendment.

The problem with the law's phrasing has been known for decades.  Rather than throwing out the statute, however, the courts would interpret the statute as containing additional elements or limitations, and would evaluate each case to see if the statute was unconstitutional "as applied."  People v. Dupont, 107 A.D.2d 247, 253 (1st Dept. 1985).  People v. Smith, 89 Misc. 2d 789 (App Term. 2d Dept. 1977).

In 2003, the Court of Appeals found this statute unconstitutional. People v. Mangano, 100 N.Y.2d 569, 571 (2003).

By that point, however, the legislature had already amended the statute, and thus Mangano was based on the pre-2001 version and is not necessarily binding on charges brought under the latter version.  Rather than address the Constitutional concerns, however, the 2001 amendments were mostly stylistic.  Whereas the statute previously said "communicates, or causes a communication," now it is divided into two paragraphs, one starting with "communicates," and the other starting with "causes a communication."  

In 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found the current version of the statute unconstitutional, and found that the City of New York could be civilly liable for enforcing it.  Although the constitutional issue was not appealed, the Second Circuit sent the matter back for further submissions on whether the City had an option to enforce the law, or if it was required by the State.  The matter was settled prior to another written decision being issued. Vives v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 346, 357-358 (2d Cir. 2008).

Following Mangano and Vives, some courts have held that this subdivision one of Penal Law 240.30 is unconstitutional and dismissed charges brought under that section, while others continue to enforce it depending upon how it is being applied. See People v Louis, 2011 Slip Op 21254, 927 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597 (Nassau County Dist. Ct., 2011).

The overbroad wording is a problem that could probably be fixed by simply adding the phrase "with no lawful purpose" to the law, but given the emerging phenomena of cyber-bullying and related issues, the legislature may want to do additional re-writing.  There are other disorderly conduct laws on the books that deal with general "threatening behavior," so it is not as if people are permitted to run amock, but this law, if properly worded, is supposed to deal directly with threatening or harassing phone calls and similar written/electronic communications.

Personal Injury Attorney

Personal Injury litigation has been one of my main practice areas since I started law school. Among other things, I clerked with several personal injury law firms, won my school's first year award and graduation prize in torts, and was president of the school's trial lawyer's association.

After law school, I worked for a Manhattan law office with a prominent personal injury practice, and published several articles on personal injury law. I managed a decent-size caseload, and settled or tried numerous cases.

After several years of commuting, I joined a Suffolk County law firm. I plan to stay here, raise a family, and build a successful career. With my current firm, we have solid matrimonial and business practices, and I am trying to build in the areas of employment and personal injury.

I am an extremely good personal injury attorney. I understand the law, and I am adept at valuing cases. I treat my clients with respect and compassion, and work hard to obtain the best recovery for them that I can. I can negotiate settlements, but also have no hesitation in trying cases to verdict when appropriate.

Divorce Lawyer - Happily Married

Can you have a happily married divorce attorney? Of course you can - I am. I love my wife very much, and even if we fight divorce isn't on the table.

Divorce isn't a good thing. You may be looking at my site because you're in the middle of a fight, and things seem terrible, and your not happy - it happens. But should you get divorced?

If you're not sure, then the answer is probably no. It's not something to do lightly.

People do, however, get divorced. Some people are sure. However the marriage ended, it ended, and it's done.

As lawyers, whether as a divorce attorney, personal injury attorney, or many other areas, we help people move forward in their lives after bad things happen. Not on an emotional level necessarily, but with practical and financial matters.

So, if you are looking at this site wondering if you should get divorced, you're not going to find an answer. You can learn about the process, and what your rights are, but whether you should get a divorce is not something a divorce lawyer will help you with.

If you have decided to get divorced, I'm sorry to hear it, and I'm sure you have your reasons. Good reasons, bad reasons, your fault, their fault - whatever it is, I'm not here to judge.

You will need someone on your side throughout the process, who can protect your interests, help you understand what your legal rights are, help you make reasoned decisions, and not just be in your corner but get in the ring with you or for you as needed. That's what a divorce attorney is here for.